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HONG KONG’S CURRENCY BOARD
AND CHANGING MONETARY REGIMES
ABSTRACT
The paper discusses the historical background and institutional details of Hong Kong’s
currency board. We argue that its experience provides a good opportunity to test the macroeconomic
implications of the currency board regime. Using the method of Blanchard and Quah (1989), we
show that the parameters of the structural equations and the characteristics of supply and demand
shocks have significantly changed since adopting the regime. Variance decomposition and impulse
response analyses indicate Hong Kong’s currency board is less susceptible to supply shocks, but
demand shocks can cause greater short-term volatility under the system. The decent performance
of Hong Kong’s currency board is due mainly to the stable fiscal policy of its government. Counter-
factual exercises also show that three-fourths of the reduction in observed output volatility and two-
thirds of that in observed inflation volatility are explained by the adoption of the currency board,
while the remainder is explained by changes in the external environment, The improvement in
stability does not rule out the possibility of monetaty collapse, however.
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HONG KONG HONG KONG1. Introduction
Currency board, first introduced in the British colony of Mauritius in 1849, is a
rule-based monetq institution that is rather different from a central bank. Although
there are variations, a typical currency board has two essential characteristics. First,
the board has the obligation to exchange on demand local currency for some major
international currency, which is often called the reserve currency, and vice versa, at a
fixed exchange rate stipulated in the legislation. Second, local currency is issued based
on at least 100 percent reserve of securities denominated mainly in the reserve
currency.
Since the nineteenth century, dozens of currency boards had been established in
British colonies and other places, often in response to monetary or exchange rate
disturbances.’ However, when these colonies became independent nations after World
War II, most of them decided to replace the currency board with a central bank. Only
very few currency boards still survive today. Some people may be inclined to believe
that this form of monetary institution has already lost its practical importance. This
judgment is premature. Recently, Argentina and Estonia have enacted laws to establish
currency boards, which have also been recommended for Russia, Bulgaria and some
other nations in Eastern Europe (see Hanke, Jonung, and Schuler (1993)). The
currency crisis of Mexico in 1995 has further stimulated people to consider the system
seriously. If this renewed interest could be sustained and these countries were to adopt
currency boards eventually, then as Schwartz (1993) had commented, “a watershed
would have been reached in the annals of political economy.”
1 For more detailed discussion of the history of currency boards, see Schwartz (1993) and Hanke
and Schuler (1994). See also Walters and Hanke (1992).
1Do the potential benefits of currency boards outweigh their costs in these
countries? Some of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of currency boards
are well known.2 For example, convertibility of currency is guaranteed and there is
little or no uncertainty about the exchange rate. On the other hand, in times of
domestic liquidity crisis, a currency board arrangement cannot act as a lender of last
resort. In theory, its reserve currency can only be used to buy local currency or foreign
securities. It would be a violation of its basic principle if the reserve were to be used
to purchase the assets of a domestic bank suffering from a run.3 Moreover, since
currency board is a rule-based arrangement, active discretionary monetary policies are
precluded. Whether this macroeconomic self-discipline is regarded as an advantage,
however, is more controversial.
To assess the viability of adopting currency boards as the monetary institution, we
should not satisfy ourselves with theoretical discussions alone. Since they have been in
existence for almost one and a half centuries, a more fruitful appro,ach is to analyze
rigorously the empirical data generated from actual experience. This literature is
generally lacking. In this paper, we shall analyze the macroeconomic implications of a
currency board regime using Hong Kong data and methods developed by Blanchard
2
3
Williamson (1995) provides a useful summary of the advantages and disadvantages of currency
boards.
The currency board of Hong Kong is an exception to this rule. There is no formal legislation
prohibiting the board from using its foreign exchange to purchase domestic assets, although the
board has so far refrained from doing so in a significant way. See the balance sheet in Table 7. One
interpretation is that the legislature provides an “escape clause” with which the board can act as a
lender of last resort during financial crises. As long as the escape clause is only invoked in truly
exceptional and justifiable situations, it will not jeopardize the credibility of the currency board, See
Persson and Tabellini (1991) for an illustration and discussion of escape clause models. See also
footnote 14.
2and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 1994). The viability of the
regime is also discussed.
In the next section, we shall briefly discuss the historical background of Hong
Kong’s currency board and argue why its experience provides us with a unique natural
experiment to evaluate some aspects of the system. In Section 3, we shall outline the
structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model implemented in this paper. Section 4
presents the quantitative results and their interpretations. Section 5 summarizes some
general properties and implications about currency boards that we have learned from
the Hong Kong experience.
2. Historical Background of Hong Kong’s Currency Board
The currency system of Hong Kong, following that of China, was based on the
silver standard in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries.4 In 1934, the
United States decided to buy silver at a very high fixed rate and that led to large
outflow of silver from Hong Kong and China. As a result, both governments
abandoned the silver standard. In December 1935, Hong Kong enacted the Currency
Ordinance, which was later renamed as the Exchange Fund Ordinance, and purchased
all privately held silver coins. At the same time, the note-issuing banks, which were
private enterprises, had to deposit their silver reserves with the newly created
Exchange Fund and received Certificates of Indebtedness (CIS) in return. The
Exchange Fund sold the silver in the London market for sterling. From then on, if an
authorized bank wanted to issue more notes, it was obligated to purchase more CIS
4 For more details on the historical development of the monetary regime in Hong Kong, see
Greenwood (1995), Nugee (1995), and Schwartz (1993).
3from the Exchange Fund with sterling at a fixed rate of sixteen HK dollar to one
pound. The Exchange Fund would also buy the CIS from the banks if the latter decided
to decrease the money supply. Thus, the monetary system had all the features of a
currency board, with the exception that legal tenders were issued by authorized private
banks rather than directly by the board.
The peg to the sterling lasted for more than three decades, despite four years of
interruption during World War II. In 1967, because of devaluation of the sterling, the
sixteen HK dollar peg could no longer be sustained. In July 1972 further pressure
from the devaluation of the sterling forced the eventual abolition of the link between
the sterling and HK dollar. The latter was pegged to the US dollar at a rate within an
intervention band. This also did not last long.
an inflow of capital to Hong Kong led to the
Again devaluation of the US dollar and
decision of free-floating the HK dolls
against the US dollw. The currency board system was no longer operating.
Under the free-floating, system from 1974 to 1983, authorized banks still had to
purchase CIS, which at this time were denominated in HK dollar, from the Exchange
Fund if they wanted to issue more notes. The Fund maintained an account with these
banks. The payment for the CIS was simply a transfer of credit from the banks to the
account of the Exchange Fund. Starting from May 1979, the note-issuing banks were
required to maintain 100-percent liquid-asset cover against the Fund’s short-term
deposits. This cover did not imply that the Exchange Fund could effectively limit the
creation of money because the banks could borrow foreign currency to obtain the
liquid assets. Money growth in this period was higher and more volatile than before. In
1978, the government also decided to transfer the accumulated HK dollar fiscal surplusto the Exchange Fund, which has since then become the government’s de $acto savings
account.
During the initial phase of the free-floating period, the HK dollar was very strong.
However, from 1977 onwards, it was subject to considerable downward pressure.
Trade deficit was growing. Money supply, M2, increased at the rate of almost 25
percent a year, mainly because of even faster growth in bank credit. The start of the
Sine-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong in 1982 led to a series of
financial crises: stock market crash, real estate price collapse, runs of small banks, and
rapid depreciation of the HK dollar. On October 17, 1983, the government decided to
abolish interest withholding tax on HK dollar deposits and more importantly, to go
back to the currency board system again. The exchange rate was fixed at US$ 1 = HK$
7.8. Banks issuing notes had to purchase CIS with US dollar at this rate from the
Exchange Fund. The reserves accumulated were invested mairdy in interest-bearing




changes to the currency board system of Hong Kong, or now
the “linked exchange rate system,” were introduced. In 1988, the
Exchange Fund established the new “Accounting Arrangements” which in effect
empowered it to conduct open market operations. Legislative changes
the government to have more flexibility in manipulating the interest rates
1990, the Fund was permitted to issue several kinds of “Exchange Fund





opened to provide liquidity to banks. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)
5was established in December 1992 to take over
Office and the Commissioner of Banking. The
adjusting interbank liquidity in response to changes
the power of the Exchange Fund
HKMA has since been active in
in demand conditions.
Several remarks should be made here. First, the monetary institution in Hong Kong
has not been a static system. In less than half a century, it has evolved from the silver
standard to a currency board with sterling being the reserve currency, and then to a
free-floating regime, and finally back to the currency board with a US dollar link. More
recently, as Schwartz (1993) has observed, there has been some “dilution” of the
features that distinguish a currency board. Given historical hindsight, one can hardly
believe that the present system will last forever, despite the persistent assurance by the
Hong Kong Government that the linked exchange rate is there to stay permanently.
This view is supported by the observation that historically all fixed exchange rate
regimes could not be sustained for very long periods.5 This motivates us to simulate in
Section 4.4 the conditions under which the Hong Kong currency board may collapse.
Second, from 1974 to now, Hong Kong has used two polar cases of monetary
systems, namely, free-floating (1974-83) and currency board (1983-now). There have
been no other economic institutional changes of comparable order of magnitude. The
government still adopts the “active non-interventionism” policy formulated more than
two decades ago. It has been persistently keeping the size of the government small and
leaving small budgetary surpluses in most fiscal years. It has also refrained from using
fiscal policy as a fine-tuning tool. The legal system has remained intact and Hong
Kong’s economic freedom has always been rated at the
5 Eichengreen (1994) casts doubt on the future of any pegged
highest level by international
exchange rate regime in the 21st
century. He predicts that only the two extremes of flexible exchange rate and monetary unification
will survive.
6agencies. These similarities in the two periods provide us with a relatively
homogeneous setting to conduct a natural controlled experiment to compare the
implications of the two systems.
Third, while structural homogeneity is needed for the controlled experiment on the
one hand, sufficiently rich data variation is necessary for statistical purpose on the
other. If the economic conditions of the two periods had remained perfectly stable,
then the data would hwdly contain enough information for inferring the
macroeconomic performance of the two systems. We need to observe how the two
regimes respond to external shocks. Indeed Hong Kong as a small open economy is
extremely sensitive to external shocks which may overshadow the “treatment effect” of
a currency board system. Fortunately, by adopting the approach in Blanchwd and
Quah (1989), it is possible to isolate the supply and demand shocks during the two
periods. Counter-factual simulations can be performed to identify the effects of the
change in monetary regime.
Fourth, Hong Kong has gone through a number of major economic shocks from
1974 to now. This period covers the time span of several business cycles. There have
also been big swings in real estate and stock markets. The quarterly data available are
reasonably rich in variations which allow us to make meaningful inferences.
Lastly, the economic health and significant financial strength of Hong Kong
provide an almost ideal situation to test the vulnerability of a currency board system
when it is confronted with a crisis. At the end of 1995, foreign currency assets in the
Exchange Fund amounted to US$ 57,2 billion, which was the world’s seventh largest.
The ratio of foreign currency assets in the Exchange Fund to currency in circulation
was bigger than five. The value of the government’s accumulated fiscal reserve was
7also substantial. In fact, it was contributing to one-third of the Exchange Fund (see
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (1996)). If simulations show that Hong Kong’s
currency board has to face a crisis when it is subject to shocks of specified magnitude,
then it is hard to imagine that the currency board in a country with poorer economic
health can survive under the same scenario.
3. Empirical Model
In this Section, we discuss a framework that will be used to compare the
macroeconomic performance of the flexible and linked exchange rate regimes when
they are subject to exogenous shocks. To properly take into account the heterogeneity
induced by these shocks, we adopt Blanchard and Quah’s (1989) approach to identify
them explicitly.
Our empirical framework is the structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model
initiated by Blanchard and Watson (1986), Sims (1986), and Bernanke (1986).
Following Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayourni and Eichengreen (1993, 1994),
we formulate a bivariate model in output growth and inflation rate to identify two
series of structural shocks: (1) those whose effects on output level are only transitory,
and (2) those that have permanent effects on the output level. Shocks of the first type
are interpreted as demand shocks originated from innovations in the components of
aggregate demand, while the second type are supply shocks originated from
innovations in productivity and other factors that affect aggregate supply. This
distinction is crucird for solving the identification problem discussed below. We now
briefly describe the model and refer the reader to the above references and the surveys
in Giannini (1992) and Watson (1994) for details.
8Let X, = (Ay, , Apl )’, where y, and p, denote the logarithm of output and price
level, respectively. X, is assumed to be covariance stationary and have a moving
average representation of the form
Xl – p = BOe,+ Ble,_l + B2et_2+... = B(L)el (1)
where e[= (edt , est)’ is a bivariate series of serially uncorrelated shocks with zero mean
and covariance matrix Q, B(L) = B. + BIL + B2L2+.., is a short-hand notation for the
matrix polynomial in backshift operator L, and p is the mean of Xl. (1) is taken to be
structural in that ed[and eslhave a behavioral interpretation of being the demand shock
and supply shock, respectively. The coefficient matrices in B(L) capture the
propagation muhanism of the dynamic system. In particular, the (i, j) element of Bk is
the k th step impulse response of the i th endogenous variables with respect to a one
unit increase in the j th shock.
Equation (1) is not directly estimated. We proceed in the following steps. First, we
estimate a VAR in Xl :
A(L) (Xt - ~) = U,
where {U(} is a bivariate
covariance matrix Z, and
estimated autoregressive
(2)
series of serially uncorrelated errors with zero mean and
A(L) is a matrix polynomial in L.
polynomial in (2) to obtain the
representation, which is the reduced form to (l).
x,–p = U,+ C1u,_l + C2U,-2+...= C(L)U,
Second, we invert the
Weld moving average
(3)
Again, C(L) = I + CIL + C2L2 + ... is short-hand for the matrix polynomial as stated.
In our implementation the reduced form VAR is estimated with six lags and the Weld
representation in (3) is expanded up to 200 lags which is more than adequate. Given
estimates of the reduced form parameters, C(L) and Z, and the reduced form residuals
9uI, is it possible to recover the structural parameters, B(L) and Q, and the structural
residuals et? This is a classical identification problem in simultaneous equation models
and the answer is yes provided that enough a priori restrictions have been placed on
the structural parameters. Comparing (1) and (3) it can be checked that the structural
and reduced form are related by the following relationships:
BOe, = Ut Vt. (4)
Bj =Cj BO, ~=0,1,2,... (5)
BOQBO’=x.
Equations (4) and (5)
(6)
imply that the structural form in (1) can be recovered from the
reduced form in (3) once BO isdetermined. Thus, the identification problem boils down
to imposing sufficiently many restrictions so that BO can be solved from (6).
In our bivariate system, there are seven structural parameters in BOand Q, but
ordy three reduced form parameters in Z; we thus need four restrictions to just-identify
the structural model. The first three restrictions ‘come from assuming S2 to be the
identity matrix. The zero covariance restriction dictates that the two structural shocks
are uncorrelated, implying that any cross-equation interaction of the two shocks on the
dependent variables are captured by the lag structure in B(L). The two unit-variance
restrictions imply that BO is identified up to multiple of the two standard deviations.
Thus Bj has the interpretation of being the j th step impulse response with respect to a
one-standard-deviation innovation in the structural shocks. The last restriction comes
from Blanchard and Quah’s
demand shocks are assumed
translates into the restriction
(1989) idea of restricting long-run multiplier. Since
to have no permanent effects on output level, this
that the long-run multiplier (i.e. the sum of impulse
responses) of demand shocks on output growth must be zero, i.e.
10B,, (l)= B,,,O+B,,,, +B,,,*+... =O (7)
where B11 (1) and B1t,j are the upper left-hand corner of B(l) and Bj respectively,
To see how (7) can be translated into a restriction on Bo, let .J be the lower
triangular Cholesky factor of Z and notice that (6) can be written as (after assuming Q
= I)
(8) BOBO’ = Z = JJ’
Thus B. can be determined from J up to an orthogonal transformation S, i.e.
BO= JS, SS’ = I. (9)





(5) and (9) imply
B(1) = C(l)BO = HS, H = C(l)J





which determines a and hence S. Once S is found, BO can be determined by (9), Given
Bo, the structural parameters and the structural shocks can then be recovered from the
reduced form via (4) and (5).
The output and price data are quarterly Hong Kong real per capita GDP (in
1990 price) and the corresponding GDP deflator from 1975:1 to 1995:3, taken from
various issues of Estimates of Gross Domestic ProdL[ct and Hong Kong Monthly
Digest of Statistics published by Hong Kong Government.b Both output and price
6 Quarterly population figures are obtained by log-linearly interpolating the annual data.series exhibit strong seasonality and they are deseasonalized before use by a spectral
method by Sims (1974) and implemented in Dean (1992, section 11.7). The full sample
is divided into two halves corresponding to the two exchange rate regimes: the free
float period straddles 1975:1 to 1983:3 and the currency board period covers 1983:4
to 1995:3.
4. Results and Interpretations
In this Section, we present the empirical results and interpret them, In particular,
we use these results to compare the macroeconomic performance of the free-floating
and currency board regimes from several perspectives.
4.1. Institutional Effect or Environment Effect?
Figures 1a and lb display the data for the full sample period, covering both the
free-floating and currency board regimes. It can be seen that both inflation and output
growth are somewhat more stable during the currency board years than the free-
floating years, More precisely, the standard deviation of output growth rates during
the free-floating and currency board yems are 2.94 and 2.23, respectively, and that of
the inflation rates are 1.55 and 1,05, respectively,
What is behind the observed reduction in volatility in both output growth rates and
inflation rates? Some believe that this is simply because of a more congenial
international environment during the 1980s than the 1970s. On the other hand,
advocates of fixed exchange rate and currency board, including the Hong Kong
government, sometimes argue that this is due to the inherent superiority of the linked
12exchange rate regime over the free-floating system (e.g., see Sheng (1995)). Granted
that both arguments are reasonable and neither can be rejected a priori, it is then
necessary to disentangle the “institutional effect” from the “environment effect.” In our
structural VAR model, the structural parameters, Bj‘s, play the role of institution and
the structural shocks, u, , represent the external environment. By estimating two
separate structural models for the two exchange rate regimes, we obtain two sets of
structural parameters representing the two institutions and two sets of shocks
representing two different external environments. We show below that both the
parameters and the shocks have changed.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the estimations for equation (1) in
Section 3 under free-floating and currency board. It can be seen that they are
statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively. The estimated
parameters for the structural equation (1) are different across the two regimes. This is
evident from a likelihood-ratio version of the Chow test, which rejects the null
hypotheses of no structural change at the 5 percent level.7 The result supports the
Lucas Critique. We need to use a different set of structural parameters to capture the
institutional effect due to a change in the monetary regime. It is assumed, however,
that these parameters are invariant to the exogenous shocks.
7 The likelihood ratio statistic LR = - 2(lnh - lItLI - fnLz) = -2(699.76 -291,85- 428,66) = 41.5
rejects the null hypothesis of no structural change at the 5 percent level according to a chi-squared
distribution with 26 degrees of freedom. lnh , lrrLI , and ln~ are the log likelihood values of the
VARS estimated by using the full sample (75:1 - 95:3), the free float period (75:1 - 83:3), and the
currency board period (83:4 - 95:3), respectively.
13Figures 2a and 2b present the quarterly demand and supply shocks (1975-95) that
are identified by using the econometric framework in Section 3. Table 3 reports the
summary statistics of the shocks. By the skewness and kurtosis tests, one can observe
that both types of shocks during the free-floating period exhibit substantial non-
normality which can be attributed to a few large negative shocks. The skewness of the
shocks can be clearly discerned from their empirical distributions, depicted in Figures
3a and 3b.8 Shocks during the currency board period, on the contrary, show no strong
evidence against normality, as is clear from the skewness and kurtosis tests and their
empirical distributions.
This indicates that the two exchange rate regimes are subject to exogenous shocks
of different characteristics. Simply comparing the macroeconomic performance in the
two periods without properly controlling for the environment effect can be misleading.
This forces us to use better methods.
4.2. Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions
The relative importance of demand and supply shocks changes dramatically across
the two exchange rate regimes. This is demonstrated by the results on variance
decomposition of the shocks and the estimated values of the impulse responses.
8 The empirical distribution is obtained by matching the first four sample moments with a Gram-
Charlier expansion. See Johnson and Kotz (1970), p. 15-20.
14Table 4 shows the percentages of variance in output growth rate and inflation that
can be explained by the demand shocks in the last n quarters, where n is the
corresponding number in the extreme left column. The percentages explained by the
supply shocks are given by 100 minus the table entries. Table 5 is similar to Table 4,
but shows the variance in output level and price level explained. As can be readily seen,
during the free-floating regime, demand shocks explain little the variations in output
growth and level, but a substantial fraction of inflation or price movements.9 On the
other hand, supply shocks can account for most of the output changes, but little of the
price fluctuations. In the currency board regime, the results are different. Demand
shocks can explain much of the variations in the output and price series, at least in the
short run. The movements explained by the supply shocks are also substantial.
The dynamic impulse responses of output and price with respect to demand
shocks are consistent with the vaiance decomposition results above. In Figures 4a and
4b, the impulse responses, or cumulative effects of demand shocks on output and price
during the last n quarters are plotted against n.10 The response of output is both
smaller and shorter in duration under the flexible exchange regime. On the other hand,
the response of price level under the currency board regime is smaller than that under
free-floating.
9 The values in the second and third columns of Table 5 decline when n becomes larger, This is
because the variance of output level explained by the demand shocks must converge to zero in the
long run. Readers are reminded that in Section 3, we have built in the identifying restriction that
demand shocks have no long-term effects on output level.




5b depict the impulse responses of output and price to supply
The effects of supply shocks on price level across the two
a result consistent with simple economics. The impact of supply
shocks on price level in the currency board regime appears to be bigger than that under
free-floating. Supply shocks, however, has smaller effect on output during the currency
board years. These results are also consistent with the patterns in variance
decomposition,
What can we draw from the variance decomposition and impulse response
exercises? In fact, the results can be interpreted in a convenient way. The aggregate
supply curve during the free-floating years is very steep. It has flattened in the
subsequent period, The aggregate demand curve, on the other hand, has a relatively
flat slope under free-floating. It has steepened in the currency board regime. These
changes in the slope explain why the Chow test detects structural shift in the model.
Why has the aggregate supply curve, or more properly, the short-run supply curve,
flattened over time? Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) has discovered a similar pattern
for the industrial countries over the last one hundred years. The explanation does not
necessarily lie in the adoption of the currency board. After all, during part of the
sample period studied by Bayoumi and Eichengreen, the countries were moving from
fixed exchange to free-floating, while in the case of Hong Kong, it was heading in the
opposite direction. The flattening of the short-run aggregate supply curve indicates
that there are more nominal rigidities. Probably the latter are due to the increases in
labor legislation and union influences in Hong Kong since the 1980s.11
II A numberof lawson laborprotectionhave been introduced since the 1980s. These range from long-service
payment, severance compensation, leaves for pregnant female workers and so forth.
16The steepening of the aggregate demand curve under currency board can be
usefully analyzed by a simple textbook model (Sachs and Larrain, 1993, Chap. 13 and
14). In a fixed exchange rate regime, an increase in the domestic price will hurt export
and increase import. The underlying IS curve of the economy will shift to the left.
Since a small open economy has to face a given world interest rate, the LM curve will
have to adjust endogenously so that it intersects the IS curve at the level equal to the
world interest rate. The decline in output due to the increase in price, and hence the
slope of the
magnitude of
aggregate demand curve, is therefore completely determined by the
the movement of the IS curve. In the case of free-floating, an increase
in price causes the LM curve to move to the left. The changes in the exchange rate and
price will then lead to an adjustment of the IS curve so that it intersects the LM curve
at an interest rate equal to the prevailing world interest rate. This time the slope of the
aggregate demand curve depends on how responsive
an increa-se in price. In general, the slope of the
the LM curve is with respect to
aggregate demand curve under
currency board can be either steeper or flatter than that under free-floating, depending
on the relative responsiveness of the IS and LM curves to a change in price level. It
appears that the IS curve in Hong Kong is not as sensitive to price change than the LM
curve. Thus the aggregate demand curve is steeper under currency board. 12
We can draw the following conclusions from the results above. The output in
Hong Kong under a currency
which are usually not induced
board seems to be less susceptible to supply shocks,
by government short-term policies. However, demand
shocks do cause greater short-term volatility in output under the currency board
12 It can be shown by a simple calibrated model that the IS curve in Hong Kong is not as
responsive to price changes as the LM curve.
17system, If a government with a currency board is able to discipline itself to pursue a
stable and predictable fiscal policy, the volatility of the economy may be lower than
that under free-floating. An explanation of why Hong Kong’s economy has been less
volatile after the adoption of the linked exchange rate is that stable fiscal policy has
always been the philosophy of the financial branch of its government.
4.3. Counter-factual Simulations
As discussed in Section 4.1, the two periods under consideration are subject to
shocks with different properties. One way to compare the performance of the two
regimes is to consider the following two cases:
Case 1: What would have happened to the economy if the currency board system
were adopted from 1975 to 1983?
Case 2: What would have happened to the economy if the free-floating system were
adopted from 1983 to 1995?
To answer the question in Case 1, we apply the demand and supply shocks of 1975
to 1983 to equation (1) which has been estimated for the currency board regime, and
compare the simulated results
question, we do the simulations
with the actual
in a similar way,
time path. To answer” the second
but this time we apply the shocks of
1983 to 1995 to equation(1) for the free floating regime. The approach is based on the
assumption that the supply and demand shocks identified in the estimation procedure
of Section 3 are invariant to the change in exchange rate regime. This erogeneity
assumption makes a lot of sense for Hong
external sector is much larger than its GDP,
Kong. In this small open economy whose
most of the supply and demand shocks are
external. The government has been following the same stable fiscal policy throughout
18the two periods under consideration. Moreover, there is no central bank in Hong Kong
to determine the money supply, which is largely rule-based in both regimes and
automatically adjusts to external shocks. Thus, there is no a priori reason to believe
that the supply and demand shocks are regime dependent.
The counter-factual exercise amounts to replacing the structural residual e, in
equation (1) by a hypothetical residual e~ * and then simulating a new data path X,*,
given structural parameters & and B(L), For example, in Case 1, e,, W,and B(L) are the
residual and structural parameters for the free-floating regime, while et* is taken to be
the residual for the currency board regime. In practice, however, the moving average
representation in equation (1) is difficult to work with. We instead perform the
simulation by equation (2) with a reduced form residual u~* constructed from et* via
equation (4). It is straightforward to check that our two-step procedure is equivalent
to a direct simulation of equation (1).
Summaries of these counter-factual simulations are presented in Table 6. The
results show that if the currency board system were adopted in the first period, then
the average growth rate would have declined, but inflation would have gone down
also. Since the standard deviations are also lower, we can say that both output growth
and inflation would have been more stable. The patterns for the second period are
similar, The cost of a currency board system is lower output growth. However, there
are also benefits. Inflation rate decreases and the economy is less volatile. The tradeoff
19is transparent when the comparison is in terms of levels (rather than growth rates) as
depicted in Figures 6a, b, and 7a, b.
The counter-factual simulations disentangle the effects of regime shift and changes
in the external environment. AS an example, consider the reduction in output growth
volatility when the monetary system changes from free-floating to currency board. The
standard deviation of output growth rates goes down from 294 to 2.33, a roughly 32
percent reduction in volatility. From simulation case 1, we see that if the currency
board system were adopted to the environment of the 1970s, output volatility would
have declined to 2.46, a 20 percent reduction from 2.94. This implies that 62.5 percent
of the reduction in output volatility that we actually observe from the data is due to the
adoption of the currency board, while the remaining 37.5 percent is due to a more
tranquil external environment in the 1980s. Similarly, the marginal effect of the
currency board on inflation volatility is to reduce it from 1.55 to 1.21, or about 28
percent reduction. The observed reduction, however, is from 1.55 to 1.05, or a decline
of 48 percent. One can then have the following decomposition. The difference in
external environment during the 1970s and 1980s accounts for 42 percent of the
reduction in inflation volatility, while the change in the monetary regime explains the
remaining 58 percent of the reduction.
4.4 Currency and Banking Crises
The Hong Kong government has been vehemently claiming that the Exchange
Fund is finmcially strong and the
seen from the balance sheet of the
linked exchange rate will be defended. As can be
Fund in Table 7, Hong Kong indeed owns one of
the largest foreign reserves in the world. Does it mean that the HK$ 7,8 link is immune
20from acnsis?In theory, a crisis does not occur even when people exchange all the
currency for foreign assets because of the 100 percent back-up. However, one should
note that in mid-1995, total M3 equals to HK$ 2244 billion, which is more than five
times bigger than the assets in the Fund. 46.2 percent of this M3 is in bank deposits
denominated in foreign money. 13Suppose people decide to change the portfolio of M3
by exchanging HK dollar deposits for foreign money. If the change is big enough, the
banking sector must sell its domestic assets for foreign money to avoid bank runs. It is
not clear whether the Fund is willing to buy these domestic assets. However, the
Exchange Fund Ordinance does allow the Financial Secretary the flexibility to do so
even though Hong Kong’s moneta~ institution is a currency board. 14Suppose the
Exchange Fund will indeed provide the foreign liquidity to avoid bank runs. If people
decide to increase their foreign exchange holdings from 46.2 percent to 53 percent of
M3, the accumulated earnings in the balance sheet of the Fund will disappear. If the
foreign deposits ratio goes up further to 59.4 percent, dl the fiscal reserve will also be
used up,
These rather simplistic calculations tell us that a run on the Hong Kong dollar
could occur even when the change in people’s portfolio holdings is not exceptionally
big. We do not have an estimate of the portfolio holdings as a function of other
vmiables. However, one can reasonably speculate that the confidence in the HK dollar
13 Hong Kong Monetary Authority (1996).
14 The Exchange Fund Ordinance, Section 3 (2), states that “The Fund, or any part of it, may k
held in Hong Kong currency or in foreign exchange or in gold or in silver or may be invested by the
Financial Secretary in such securities or other assets as he, after having consulted the Exchange
Fund Advisory Committee, considers appropriate.” (Hong Kong Monetary Authority (1994), p, 51).
See also footnote 3.
21will suffer significantly and the link will face a crisis if the fiscal reserve is completely
used up.
The amount of fiscal reserve is affected by shocks to the economy. Since the Hong
Kong government has been following a reasonably stable fiscal policy, we focus oLlr




This can be answered by making use of the empirical estimates in
impulse response of the logarithm of y(t) with respect to a supply
shock of one standard deviation is 0.0143. This means that a one-standard-deviation
shock will reduce output permanently by 1.43 percent, other things being equal. Thus,
we can calculate the post-shock output level y(t)* by the formula
y(t)* = (1 - 0.0143X) y(f)
for a supply shock of x standard deviations. Similarly for K periods of negative supply
shocks, each of size x, the post-shoc,k output level should be
y(t) * = (1 - 010143X)Ky([)
In Table 8, we calculate the percentages, 100 (y(t)*/ y(t)), for x = 1,2,3,4 and K =
1,2,...,.8. From data of 1985-1994, the average ratios of total government expenditure
and revenue to GDP are 16 percent and 16.8 percent, respectively. 15We assume that
the revenue ratio is fixed. Post-shock revenue is
0.168y(t)* = [0.168 (1 - 0.0143x)~] y(t).
Thus, the effect of the supply shock on revenue is
new, effective tax rate being the term inside the
equivalent to a “tax-cut” with the
square brackets above. These are
15 Hong Kong Annual Repon, various years.
22shown in Table 9. From GDP data, we can infer that each percentage point decline in
the revenue-output ratio will reduce revenue by HK$ 12 billion. Making use of Table
8, one can come up with results in different scenarios. For example, if there are
negative 3-standard-deviation supply shocks lasting for two years, then the loss in
revenue every year will be approximately HK$ 51.6 billion. It only takes about three
years for the fiscal reserve
government from reducing
to be completely depleted if political pressures prohibit the
its expenditures accordingly. Since major historical changes
in Hong Kong’s future are upcoming, large negative supply shocks or perhaps even
significant structural shifts in the transition period cannot be ruled out. The stability of
the currency board system in the future has yet to be tested.
Currency crises can lead to bank runs. But bank runs can occur because of other
reasons too. Since the typical currency board does not provide a lender of last resort,
bank runs are often regarded as the Achilles Heel of the system. Indeed banking crises
did occur in Hong Kong a number of times, all during the currency board years. The
government and the banking system resorted to several ways to deal with them.
In 1994 there were 180 licensed banks in Hong Kong, 16 of which were owned
mostly by local shareholders (Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 1994, p. 90-91).
Government policies towards runs on local and foreign banks seemed to be different. It
did not attempt to support the Citibank in 1991 when rumors caused a short-lived run,
nor did it try to rescue the Bank of Credit
branch before its collapse in the same year.
and Commerce International’s Hong Kong
However, it moved to take over two small
local banks in the mid 1960s and three more in the period of 1982-86. It also provided
some emergency funds to support five banks in the same period, four of which were
later acquired by others. The note-issuing banks also played an important role in
23cushioning the shocks from the runs. They supported one bank in 1961, three in 1965-
66, and took over three more in the same period. Thus, in the 1960s, the government
was relying mainly on the financially strong note-issuing banks to either lend to or take
over the troubled local banks. In more recent years, the government seemed to have
resorted to the Exchange Fund for playing the role of lender of last resort. ]GThis is
another reason to say that some of the features of a currency board have been diluted
in Hong Kong.
5. What Can We Learn From Hong Kong’s Experience?
The performance of the currency board in Hong Kong has not been bad so far.
Although it may have lowered output growth, inflation has also gone down. In fact,
the more revealing results from the counter-factual exercises concern stability. When
both regimes are subject to the same exogenous shocks, output and prices are less
volatile under currency board.
The stability result is not general. Simulations on impulse responses show that
output is less sensitive to supply shocks under currency board than under free-floating.
On the other hand, demand shocks can cause stronger short-term volatility in output in
a currency board system. The relative stability in output in Hong Kong to a large
extent must have come from the government’s self-discipline in fiscal policy, which is
based on two rules: balanced budget or small surplus, and keeping government size
16 See Jao (1993, Chap. 13) and Ho et al (1991, Chap.1) for more details about banking crises in
Hong Kong.
24small. Other countries without a stable rule-based fiscal policy may not do well to
reduce output volatility even if they have currency boards. * 7
The fiscal restraint not only affects output stability, but also the credibility of the
exchange rate system. A weakness of the currency board system is that people may
doubt the determination and capability of the government to maintain perfect
convertibility at the specified rate. The conservative fiscal policy has been instrumental
in creating surpluses for almost every budgetary year. Without the significant fiscal
reserve, confidence in the Hong Kong dollar may suffer. In recent years, since the
Exchange Fund has been acting as if it could be the lender of last resort, its financial
strength which is partly supported by a large fiscal reserve is all the more important.
Perhaps a reason why fiscal policy in Hong Kong is coordinated with its monetary
system is that the Financial Secretary has the authority to control both.
Despite the financial strength of the Exchange Fund, the Hong Kong dollar has
occasionally been subject to considerable speculative pressure. For example, in mid-
Janu~ 1995, the Hong Kong dollar depreciated 0.4 percent briefly. In all such
occasions, the speculations have been effectively countered (Hong Kong Monetary
Authority (1995)). Given the excellent track records, do people have enough
confidence in the Hong Kong dollar? As mentioned in Section 4.4, 46.2 percent of M3
is in deposits denominated in foreign currency. This large portion is an indication that
17 The Financial Secretary of Hong Kong last year articulated his commitment to the non-
interventionist rule-based fiscal policy by referring to a story in Greek mythology. The half-bird
half-lady Sirens sang so beautifully that all sailors who heard them would dive into the sea and try
to swim to them, only to drown and die at their feet. He said that he would tie himself to the mast of
the ship when he heard them singing. See Tsang (1995).
25people only have limited confidence in the future of the Hong Kong dollar, in spite of
all the assurance that the government has provided.
Should other countries adopt the currency board system? The above analysis
indicates that the decent performance in Hong Kong has been due to a combination of
favorable factors, and yet, the possibility of monetary collapse cannot be ruled out. It
is doubtful that too many countries have equal or better conditions.
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28Date I Exchange rate regime I Reference rate
Until 4 Nov 1935 I Silver standard
6Dec 1935 Pegged to Sterling 21 =HK$16
23 NOV 1967 El =HK$14,55
~::::::bands”ounda ~
Fixed to US dollar with ~2.25% US$l = HK$5.65
25 NOV 1974 I Free float
17 Ott 1983 I Pegged to US dollar US$I = HK$7.80
Source: Nugee (1995).
Table 2: Summary statistics of VAR estimation
VAR 1 (free-floating) VAR 2 (currency board)
dependent variable output growth rate inflation rate output growth rate inflation rate
R2 0.35 0.53 0.35 0.43
DW 1.7 1.58 2.01 1.97
Ljung-Box Q [0.42] [0.88] [0.86] [0.12]
overall significance [0.01] [0.001]
data range 75QI - 83Q3 83Q4 - 95Q3
. Numbers in squared brackets are p-values.
l “Overall significance” reports the p-value of a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that all
regressors in the system (except the constant terms) are zero.
Table 3 Characteristics of structural disturbances
Demand shocks Sllpp]y shocks
Free-floating Currency Board Free-floating Currency Bo~d
Skewness -1,01 [0,003] -0.18 [0.57] -0.91 [0.008] -0.31 [0.34]
Kurtosis 4.50 [0,03] 3.47 [0.38] 4.69 [0.01] 2.91 [0.95]
Maximum 1.84 2.40 1.97 2.04





Skewness (b]1’2 ) = m3/m23’2 and Kurtosis (b2) = ~/m22. mkis the k th sample moment around
mean.
Numbers in squmed brackets are p-values for testing either the population skewness= O
(symmetry) or kurtosis = 3 (normal shape).
For testing symmetry, Fisher’s test statistic ~= x(l+3/n+9 l/4n2) - (3/2n)(l-l 1l/2n)(x3-3x) -
(33/8n2)(x5-10x3+15x) is approximately distributed w N(O,1) under the null hypothesis, where x
= b]“2(n-1)/(6(n-2))1’2 , and n is the sample size. The approximate normality is very accurate even
in small sample, see Kendall and Stuart (1958) p.298.
For testing kurtosis = 3, the test statistic z = y[(n- l)(n-2)(n-3)/24 n(n+l)] ‘n is approximately
distributed m N(O,l) under the null hypothesis, where y = [n2/(n-l)(n-2)( n-3)] [(n+l)~ - 3(n-
l)m22]/s4, and s is the sample standard deviation (with divisor n-1). See Kendall and Stuart
(1958) p.305-306.Table 4 Percentage of forecast error variance explained by demand shocks
Output growth rate Inflation rate
Quarter Free-floating Currency Board Free-floating Currency Board
1 0.66 67.16 96,57 16.71
4 9.62 57.71 86.40 37.79
8 9.25 62.61 82,38 37.52
12 9.63 62.65 82.05 38.78
16 9.76 62.70 81.83 39.10
20 9.75 62.78 81.83 39.21
24 9.76 62.80 81.79 39.27
28 9.77 62.81 81.79 39.28
32 9.77 62.81 81.79 39.29
l The corresponding percentages explained by supply shocks are given by 100 minus the table
entries
Table 5 Percentage of forecast error variance explained by demand shocks
Output level Price level
Quarter Free-floating Currency Board Free-floating Currency Board
1 0.002 80.44 99.94 8.28
4 0.124 73.51 99.99 74.38
8 0.050 33.06 99.87 86.20
12 0.024 16.18 99.45 84.55
16 0.013 9.21 99.20 83.16
20 0.008 5.65 99.12 83.45
24 0,005 3,79 99.00 83.37
28 0.004 2.72 98.88 83.09
32 0.003 2.03 98.80 83.02
l ‘I’hecorresponding percentages explained by supply shocks are given by 100 minus the table
entries
Table 6 Counter-factual simulation
Output growth rate 70 Inflation rate 70
Mean Standard dev. Mean Standard dev.
Case 1 (1975-83)
Actual (FF) 1.54 2.94 2.07 1.55
Simulated (CB) 1.27 2.46 1.82 1.21
Case2 (1983-95)
Actual (CB) 1.22 2.23 1.94 1.05
Simulated (FF) 1,51 2.79 2.13 1.36
. CB = currency board
l FF = free floating
--Table 7 Exchange Fund Balance Sheet
HKSrM
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 611995
ASS~
Foreign currency assets 127,089 149,152 192,323 225,333 274,%8 335.499 3M,359 418,334
Hong Kong dol!arassets 5,962 9,625 3,874 10,788 12.545 12,987 24,126 3I,454
133,051 ~5a,777 1%,197 236,121 287,494 348,486 408,4s5 449,788
LIABtL~lES
Certi6ca[e of[ndebtedness 31,731 37,191 40,791 46,410 58.130 68,801 74,301 74,630
‘Escal Resew eAccoun[ 38,269 5.2,546 63.226 69,802 96.135 I15,6s3 131,240 [43,%8
Coins in cixula[ion 1,890 2,012 2,003 2,299 2559 2,604 3,372 3,332
,tihange Fund Bi!ls and No[es o 0 6,671 13,624 19,324 25,157 46,140 50,840
Balance of banking system 860 978 480 Sm 1,480 1,385 2208 2,247
,O(herhabililies 2S54 1,m3 391 4,834 3J20 7,314 22,614 22,056
I 75,3C4 94,3N 113,562 137,469 180,858 220,944 279,875 297,013
ACCUMULATE23 MRNINGS 57,747 64.447 82,635 98,652 1M,636 127,542 128,610 152,775
L !






























‘able 9 Post-shock effective revenue-output ratio 70
size of negative supply shocks
(in standard deviation)
Iuration (quarters) 1 2 3 4
1 16.6 16.3 16.1 15.8
2 16.3 15.9 15,4 14.9
3 16.1 15.4 14.7 14.1
4 15.9 15.0 14.1 13.3
5 15.6 14,5 13.5 12,5
6 15.4 14.1 12.9 11.8
7 15.2 13.7 12.4 11,1
8 15.0 13.3 11.8 10.5











































Figure 2bDensity function of demand shocks
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Density function of supply shocks
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Price Response to Supply Shocks
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Plain line = actual (free-floating); Boxed line = simulated (currency board)


















Plain line = actual (currency board); Boxed line= simulated (free-floating)